As research studying the clean-up efforts ramps up, concerning data emerges.

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Transcript

Cold Open

[Music]

Dan Leone (host): 

In the United States of America, basically anyone – including foreign nationals – can submit a Freedom of Information Act request. You can reach out to a government agency and ask them to provide you with records that you suspect exist. Legally, federal agencies are required to respond to your FOIA request within 20 business days – it is very likely that they won't give you what you're asking for within 20 business days, but they do at least have to respond.

If you’ve never filed a FOIA request, I highly recommend doing so. It’s a lot of fun. 

I wanted records pertaining to this:  

US Coast Guard Meredith Austin:
Good afternoon. Yesterday, seven crewmen aboard working Vessel of Opportunity vessels were medevaced to West Jefferson Hospital after several of them reported experiencing nausea, dizziness, headaches, and chest pains while performing offshore response operations.

A medical emergency from May 26th, 2010, wherein cleanup workers had to be medevaced to a hospital, and 125 vessels were recalled from the Gulf as a precaution. 

Officials from the Coast Guard and BP suggested several possible causes of the workers’ symptoms: 

US Coast Guard Mary Landry:
As you all know, the, uh, heat and humidity in Louisiana can be challenging…

US Coast Guard Meredith Austin:
It's possible that just by being around the odor of petroleum, for some individuals are sensitive to it…

BP CEO Tony Hayward:
Food poisoning is clearly a big issue, and it’s something we have to be very, very mindful of.

But those who claim to have had information from the hospital that treated the workers reported something else at the time…

Clint Guidry:
I was being told by the emergency room people…

AP Reporter Janet McConaughey:
…all of the symptoms were typical of chemical exposure…

Clint Guidry:
…uh, it's chemical poisoning.

So which was it? Chemical exposure or heat stroke? Chemical poisoning or food poisoning?

Unified Command said at the time that the Coast Guard, BP, and OSHA would be investigating the incident. Did they ever do so? And if they did, what did their investigations conclude?

To try and answer all those questions, Betsy Shepherd, Ripple’s Senior Reporter, filed a bunch of FOIA requests. And the two of us found ourselves navigating a bureaucratic hedge maze.  

Dan:

All right. Hold up, gimme a level. Talk.

Betsy Shepherd:
Check, check, check, check, check. Can you hear me?

Dan:
Yeah, I can hear you really well. Okay, cool. So, um, you got a FOIA response from the Coast Guard. You were just filling me in. I'm at a rest stop in Alabama. Go.

Betsy Shepherd:
Okay. So, um, for one thing, they said that, uh, they say, “This is our final response to your, um, Freedom of Information Act request. All Deepwater Horizon documentation or reports are publicly available at the Outer Continental Shelf National Center of Expertise.”
Dan:
Okay. Where, where is, where is that? [laughter]

Betsy Shepherd:
It says it's in Houma, Louisiana.

Dan:
You reached out to OSHA as well, right?

Betsy Shepherd:
I did. I reached out to OSHA, but apparently there are no, they have no files related to this event. 

So I appealed it and I sent them, you know, the recording of the press conference where it says that OSHA was investigating it. I sent them press releases. I sent them news articles as backup evidence, um, you know, uh, pushing back against their claim that they don't have documentation. And I've never heard any, I've never heard back from, about the appeal. And I've called and emailed, um, no update on the appeal. So…

Dan:
Um, okay, fantastic. I mean, well not fantastic. The opposite of fantastic is what I mean to say. [laughter]

Betsy Shepherd:
I mean, it's just, it's, it is just funny that like they keep like referring us to other, like the Outer Continental Shelf National Center of Expertise, also known as OCSNCOE.

Dan:
Do they have, do they have a brick and mortar office that we could just go to?

Betsy Shepherd:
There is an address. It's in Houma, Louisiana, so we should plan to go there.

Dan:

Yeah, let’s go there…(fade out)

Betsy continued pulling the thread on the question of what happened to the medevaced workers. 

And at the same time, I wanted answers to this question: could a chemical dispersant really be responsible for the symptoms reported by cleanup workers?

In short – is Corexit toxic to humans, or not?

From Western Sound and APM Studios, I'm Dan Leone.

This is Ripple.  

[Music]

In 2010, BP was preparing to defend itself against an imminent deluge of lawsuits. And the company had hired researchers to study the impacts of the spill.

Wilma Subra:
They made sure any research that was done was done under their supervision.

This is Wilma Subra, a chemist who advocated for workers during the spill, and I looked into what she was alleging here.

I found that some researchers hired by BP were contractually prohibited from sharing or publishing their research. They also had to agree that if there was a court order for their research, they would delay providing their research if BP fought the order.  

Dan:
Did they ever try to hire you?

Wilma Subra:
No. But a lot of people tried to find people at universities to, to hire, to evaluate it and they couldn't. They had already been hired by BP.

And nobody's gonna talk to you.

Dan:
Nobody will talk to me?

Wilma Subra:
No.

Dan:
Why not?

Wilma Subra:
Because that was what they signed. No disclosure as well.

Dan:
But I'm a nice person to talk to. I, I feel like – 

Wilma Subra:
Money, honey [laughter]... (dip under)  

In fairness, the NDA that I saw only had restrictions for three years, but I took her point. If I was going to be looking into studies about the toxicity of Corexit, I should be mindful about who paid for them. Fair enough. 

Let’s start with the EPA’s own studies on Corexit: in 2010, after BP rebuffed their directive to switch to a different dispersant, the EPA tested Corexit’s toxicity in comparison to seven other dispersants.

The EPA concluded that all the dispersants tested were generally no more or less toxic than one another. Basically, they said there wasn’t much difference. 

This appeared to validate BP’s position that there wasn’t a need to switch dispersants.

But there's this study I see referenced most often by critics of Corexit. It was published in 2013. As far as I can tell, it wasn't linked to the EPA, or funded by BP, and when it dropped, it caused a bit of a stir. 

Terry Snell:

My name is, uh, Dr. Terry Snell. Most of my career, I have engaged in, uh, research on ecotoxicology.
 

Dr. Snell has spent most of his career studying the effects of human-made chemicals, or toxicants, on organisms. He and his team at Georgia Tech became aware of the unprecedented use of dispersants in the aftermath of the spill.

Terry Snell:

We started to wonder whether the application of dispersants on the oil spill were, um, advisable, or what were the consequences, actually.

So the EPA tested Corexit's toxicity against other dispersants. 

But Dr. Snell's study asked a fundamentally different question: which is more toxic – crude oil alone, or, crude oil mixed with Corexit? In essence, is our cure for an oil spill worse than the disease? 

They performed their tests on something called a rotifer – a creature I confess I’d never heard of.

Dan:

What does a rotifer, what does it look like?

Terry Snell:

A rotifer is an animal, and it has, uh, fully differentiated reproductive systems, nervous systems, uh, digestive systems and so forth, locomotion systems. It's one of the smallest, uh, animals there are. It's only on the order of, say, a half a millimeter in size, so you can barely see them with your naked eye swimming around in water.

Dan:

And why are they ideal for these types of tests?

Terry Snell:

One is that they're, they're small and they reproduce quickly. Their lifespan is only about seven days at 25 degrees, so that you can see the results of a toxicant exposure very quickly. 

So Dr. Snell and his team exposed these tiny critters to four substances –

Number one:

Terry Snell:

A control, which was basically seawater.

Number two:

Terry Snell:
Corexit by itself.

Number three:

Terry Snell:

The crude oil by itself.

And, critically, number four:

Terry Snell:

A mixture of Corexit and the crude oil.

And here’s what they found:

Terry Snell:

The oil by itself and the Corexit by itself actually had similar toxicity.

And we compared that to the combined treatment where the oil was dispersed with Corexit. And that gave us substantially more toxicity.
 

Now, we also did, uh, different ratios, a one to 10 ratio Corexit to oil. So we did permutations like that. And I think the, the big biggest difference we got was like 52 times –

Dan:

52 times? 52?

Terry Snell:

52 times more toxic than the, uh, Corexit or the oil by itself.

When looking at a 1:10 ratio, Corexit to oil, toxicity increased by 52 times – or 52.48 if we want to be exact. 

But Dr. Snell cautioned that we don’t actually know what the ratio of Corexit to crude was in the real world setting. So maybe one area was more concentrated, another area was far less. With all the variables, we don’t know.

But nonetheless, for those who wanted more attention on the issue of Corexit: this study was ammunition.

And criticisms of Snell’s research soon followed.

Terry Snell:

They criticized our lack of analytical chemistry on the water accommodated fraction.

Basically, some scientists claimed that Snell and his team didn’t properly account for how oil itself dissolves in water.

But Dr. Snell later noticed a pattern with some of these critics.

Terry Snell:

The criticisms that were actually published in the scientific literature came from scientists who had a connection to BP. To me, that didn't really matter because what they were saying was actually, uh, a serious scientific criticism. But there were really no criticism of the biological effects.

Dan:

You stand by what you found, despite the criticisms?

Terry Snell:
So the overall toxicity, which is what we were concerned about, and what we were measuring, um, was what we observed. Yes, we stand by that, and other people actually have, so the work has been repeated with many different other organisms, and they generally find the same result. That is, that the dispersed oil is more toxic to the organism that, that they tested than either Corexit by itself or the, uh, un-dispersed oil. That is a well-established, uh, observation now that reinforces our conclusion.

What Dr. Snell said there is true. This is an observation that’s been made in studies focused on other small organisms. And Dr. Snell explained to me how these species can act as canaries in the coal mine for larger organisms. Like us. Like human beings.

But regardless, I wanted to speak to someone who got a little closer to testing the effects of the mixture of Corexit and crude oil on people. And that's a lot more difficult to study, because in the world of science, you're typically not allowed to just expose human beings to chemicals willy-nilly to see what happens.

[Scene ambi: highway wash; entering a building; door knocking; door opening]

Betsy Shepherd:
Hello. 

I'm not sure if you can help me, but, um, is this the front desk or is there someone –

Coast Guard Guy 1:
This is not the front desk. Who are you?

Coast Guard Guy 2:
This is the Coast Guard.

Betsy Shepherd:
Okay. So I'm a reporter doing a story about the BP oil spill. I submitted, um, records requests to the Coast Guard. And they sent me to this location, to the Outer Continental Shelf Center –

Coast Guard Guy 1:
That's downstairs.

Betsy Shepherd:
Right. And nobody is there or answering, the lights seem to be off. Do you happen to have any way – 'cause I tried calling the number and it just goes to an emergency line.

Betsy told me that her visit to the Outer Continental Shelf National Center of Expertise was a bust. Which we were expecting, but due diligence, we had to give it a shot.

The agency was just a small room in a building of other small rooms, in Houma, Louisiana. Some staff were supposed to be working there, but weren’t for some reason. 

Betsy Shepherd:
Is there any way I could grab like an, at least a contact number for some, like, trying to figure out, I just wanna schedule something so that next time I come back, there's somebody here.

Coast Guard Guy:
Uh, I'm not allowed to give out personal cell phones. 

Betsy Shepherd:
Okay. 

Coast Guard Guy:

Let me – 

Betsy Shepherd:

Is there an office number or something? 

Coast Guard Guy:
I, I didn't have, they didn't have an office number. Can I give you their email address?

Betsy Shepherd:
Sure…I did try to email them, didn't hear back, so – I know sometimes stuff just gets kind of caught up in the bureaucracy…

[door shutting; laughter]

This was a lot of effort to get an email address we already had. But that's how it goes.

And remember, directing us to the OCSNCOE was the Coast Guard’s quote “final response” to our request for the documents about the sick, medevaced workers. 

Eventually, we got a final response from OSHA as well. Remember, there was a press conference that stated OSHA would be investigating the incident. But in their response they wrote:

"Despite the press report that you reference, it" – meaning OSHA – "did not investigate the May 26, 2010 incident you reference, because the agency did not have jurisdiction over the rig, which was located approximately 40 miles offshore." 

I don't mean to be flippant, but this response doesn't make any sense to me. Our FOIA request was about crew members who were air-lifted from a Vessels of Opportunity boat. We didn't ask anything about a rig. If they're referring to the Deepwater Horizon, at the time the workers were medevaced, that rig had been at the bottom of the ocean for over a month. So it's unclear how OSHA's lack of jurisdiction over an oil rig means anything here. This is about the Vessels of Opportunity program. 

And we would have loved to have asked more. But that was OSHA's final response.

I told you FOIA requests are fun.

We'll be right back.

[Break]

While Betsy kept searching for the medevaced workers in Louisiana, I was about 500 miles southeast.  

I’d been driving for a couple days and right when I landed in Seminole Heights, Florida, the entire neighborhood lost power. The Airbnb hosts ran over and graciously gave me some candles. 

[Door closes]

Dan: 
[Dan is interrupted by a bug flying past his lips]

What in God's name? A bug got in when they opened the door, like a, a flying beetle, and it just flew into one of the candles, set itself on fire, and died.

That was my welcome to the state of Florida.

I was in Seminole Heights to talk to Dr. Danielle Reid. She's got a doctorate in environmental health toxicology, and she lived through the BP oil spill.


Danielle Reid:

I was in Louisiana. I had just finished my degree. And quite honestly, we, I was doing a lot of community work. We were actually in the trenches helping community members who were living near an oil refinery, and they were having a lot of unexplained problems.

Dr. Reid’s work centered on inhalation studies. Researching the health effects of what we breathe. And from that vantage point, the aftermath of the spill was troubling.

Danielle Reid:
I knew that we didn't know what was out there, and a lot of us was breathing it in. Nobody knew when you mix a dispersant and crude oil, what happens, you know?

So, she chose this as her dissertation topic.

As far as how her study was funded: the lab she worked in at Tulane University had received a grant – part of that money came from BP.  The crude oil was also supplied by BP, and Nalco, the manufacturer of Corexit, provided vials of the dispersant. 

But it wasn't easy to get those vials. And they came with conditions.

Danielle Reid:

That took a lot of, yeah, that took a lot of work. But we [laughs], we were able to, to get –

Dan:
What kind of work? What do you mean? What were some of the –

Danielle Reid:
Um, just a lot of clauses because of course no liability being held there. If we do find something, it's – you're getting this, but it's strictly for science purposes.

Beyond that, she didn't report any influence from BP or Nalco over her study. 

Dr. Reid says that Nalco provided a few different versions of Corexit, and she observed that there were actually two different formulas being used in the Gulf.

Danielle Reid:
One was 9500 Corexit. Then there was another one called 9527. 

A major difference between Corexit 9527 and 9500, is that 9527 contained something called 2-butoxyethanol – excessive exposure to that can cause problems in red blood cells, the liver, the kidneys.

But 2-butoxyethanol is not on the ingredient list for Corexit 9500. 

Dr. Reid’s study tested both formulas.

Danielle Reid:
Um, we started testing in humans. And so when I say humans is we used a human cell line. Um, we chose cells that are actually found in our lung tissue. And essentially we just grew the cells and we, we put them under different conditions as if they were a person.

Dr. Reid and her team exposed the lung cells to different mixtures of Corexit and crude, simulating different types of exposures.

Danielle Reid:
We did two hours, eight hours, and 24 hours. Um, and we used different doses.

Then, they looked under the microscope…

Danielle Reid:
We first looked at, well, what happens to the cell? Does it die? Does it live? And if it lives, what really is going on? 

At 24 hours of exposure to various doses, what was left was a massacre.

Danielle Reid.
They're all dying. 

With both 9527 and oil and 9500 and oil — all the lung cells were dead. 

Danielle Reid:
At lower doses, they're surviving, but just because they're surviving, we had to figure out next, okay, if they're living, what's happening in the body? Is the cell repairing itself?

And we looked at DNA because that is the heartbeat of a cell. 

Their study also measured damage to DNA within the cells. 

Dr. Reid guided me through their findings, showing me graphs and charts…

Danielle Reid:
Okay. So these are the DNA breaks, which are performed by a common …(dip under)

They found that the combination of Corexit and crude not only killed cells, but caused breaks in the DNA of surviving cells – which could dramatically inhibit their ability to repair themselves.

This effect was worst at 24 hours of exposure. At only two hours of exposure, the cells were able to fix the DNA damage and survive. 

Danielle Reid:
So the longer that the cells had exposure to the toxins, the more damage. And what we kept thinking is, the more damaged, the harder it is to send out those help calls to get the, um, cell to repair itself. 

Danielle cautioned that these studies haven't been confirmed in studies with animals – so she can't make a definite association between her findings and the health outcomes people experienced. 

Dan:
If it were up to you and money were no object, what would've been your next step from this study in your ideal world? Like what would you have wanted to do next to take it kind of to the next level?

Danielle Reid:
We wanted to look at risk. We always look at, what is the degree of risk? Um, if that person is out there collecting tarballs, what is their chances of experiencing any sort of symptoms? And often in health, in occupational health, we have this little book that we use.

The book Dr. Reid is referring to lists exposure limits for different chemicals – so the amounts a worker can be exposed to before reaching a dangerous level.

Danielle Reid:

And scientists have already told us what the risk is for every single chemical.

So they'll tell us, “If it's benzene that a person is exposed to, if you go over that, we're gonna have some consequences. Lower the risk.” In that book, there's no mixture.  

At the time of the BP oil spill, if a cleanup worker asked for data, which clearly spelled out the risks of exposure to a mixture of Corexit and crude – no one could give them that data. Because that data didn’t exist in these books. 

Danielle Reid:
And that confused me because I wanted to know, well, how would someone in the event this happened again, how could someone go out there and tell that person with confidence, “This is your degree of risk. You can take it or leave it, you know, however you want.” But, um, that would've been an ultimate, because this is, this is something that, you know, oil spills, believe it or not, they happen. They happen. They just, this was one of large scale. Dispersants, we always use them, right? But we don't have values that tell us – when it's a mixture, what is our degree of risk?

Dan:
So then you can take all these cleanup workers and you can say, “Okay, let's open the book. We say, all right, you know, we're using Corexit right now. We got an oil spill. You can only go out for an hour and a half, and then you're coming back in, and then you can't come back out for a week.” You would want that really nicely quantified.

Danielle Reid:
Absolutely. Because that is what, in a real world setting for occupational health, that is how we protect people. 

One Gulf Coast resident I spoke to said she felt like a science experiment in 2010. Another described themselves as a guinea pig. A clean up worker summarized it all as “an experimental cleanup at best.” These sentiments were easier for me to understand as I spoke to Dr. Reid.

If there was a lack of data about the true exposure risks of Corexit and crude, then why were clean up workers told air sampling was enough to declare an area safe?

Dr Reid's study drew the same conclusion that Dr. Snell's did – crude oil by itself was nowhere near as toxic as the mixture of Corexit and crude.

[Music]

I spoke with a couple experts who explained to me the theory of how Corexit and crude in combination could cause the type of symptoms reported to me by cleanup workers. Vomiting, sweating oil, memory loss, cancers.

And it’s actually not very complicated. I'll lay it out for you:

There’s volatile organic compounds in crude oil. Including benzene, a known carcinogen. Corexit disperses crude oil. Which makes the dangerous particles smaller. When they’re smaller, it’s easier to breathe in the volatile organic compounds.

Then there's a fatty protective layer on the skin – the dispersant dissolves that layer the same way it dissolves oil. Without that protective layer, it's easier for hydrocarbons in the crude oil to get into the bloodstream. 

And once these volatile compounds or hydrocarbons get inside your body, they start ripping it to pieces.

That's the theory. We’ll be right back.

[Break]


[Phone vibrating]

The day after the workers were medevaced in 2010, a representative from the Coast Guard said the Coast Guard, BP, and OSHA would be investigating the incident.

We reached out to BP asking them what they discovered in their investigation. BP never responded to our request for comment. 

And Betsy had hit dead ends with both the Coast Guard and OSHA.

But, she also filed a FOIA request with the EPA, just in case they had something on the incident. 

Dan:
Hello?

Betsy Shepherd:
Hey, um, I wanted to share some good news. I finally got a response from the EPA about my FOIA request for information related to the incident.

Dan:
Excellent.

Betsy Shepherd:
Yeah. So what is included is an incident report. Which is supposedly based on interviews with the captains of various boats who were involved. There were five different boats that had members that had to be medevaced out. Let’s see, let me read you the line… it says, “the captain reported that the entire crew had eaten the same food items on board.”

Dan:
Well, this is in line with what, uh, Tony Hayward was saying, uh, the CEO, in the aftermath, he also said food poisoning. Correct?

Betsy Shepherd:

Exactly. But, um, what really stuck out to me is that, you know, none of the other accounts from the other vessels mentioned anything about food. And I'll just read, “Captain Blank complained of headache, diarrhea, and dizziness. He stated ‘a strong chemical smell was particularly bad.’ He and his crew started feeling sick while out to sea after they smelled the chemical odor they described as bad Clorox, when they encountered a reddish material, they termed disbursement.”

Dan:
Okay.

Betsy Shepherd:
In the document, they redacted the names of people that were medevaced and also like personnel on those boats who were interviewed. But I got the names of the boats. The names of the boats are Lil Murray, Mom and Dad, Big Tattoo, Windsong, and Macy Emily. And, using that, I was able to get the names of the boat owners, and I, I've already found at least two different people that were the owners of the boats where people were evacuated. And one of those people was one of the people that was evacuated.

Dan:
Um, Betsy, this is awesome. It's really, really good.

Betsy Shepherd:
Yeah, I'm excited. I'm excited. So, like, with their names, I should be able, most of them are like in the south Louisiana area still, so I'm planning to just knock on their door and, and explain what we're doing.

The BP oil spill left a lot of wounds on Gulf Coast residents. When Betsy and I make contact with them, and ask for their stories 13 years on, we're often asking them to dredge up memories they'd rather forget.

[Door knocking; no answer]

We're asking them to reinjure themselves so we can inform the public. Sometimes, they can't do it, or they don't want to. And that's their right.

[Door knocking; no answer]

So when Betsy knocked on doors, maybe the cleanup workers who were medevaced were on the other side and they didn't feel like answering. Or maybe they didn't live there anymore. Or maybe they were out on the water fishing.

Whatever the reasons, on Betsy's first round of door knocking…

[Door knocking; no answer]

No one answered.

So when Betsy found herself in Lafitte, Louisiana – a town of about a thousand built along a bayou – she reached out to a man she knew lived in the area.

A man we hoped would help us out. Clint Guidry. He was the president of the Louisiana Shrimp Association in 2010. And he's the guy that gave this news interview after the medivac incident. 

Clint Guidry:
When I had left last night at the hospital, these workers were, I was being told by the emergency room people that they were okay and they were being stabilized.

Clint wouldn't provide names of the medevaced workers during that news interview.

Clint Guidry:
It's some people that I know. I'm not gonna say any names.

But maybe he would now. A lot changes in 13 years. 

[Music transition]

Betsy Shepherd:

Let me just, can you do a check check check?

Clint Guidry:
Check, check, check, check, check, check, check. One two, one two. 

Clint's a proud cajun, third generation fisherman, Vietnam vet, a stoic type of guy. 

He told Betsy how he got involved in all of this. 

Clint Guidry:
When the oil started moving in shore, it shut down all the inside waters too, you know, so we got a bunch of mad fishermen, can't go back to work. 

The Louisiana Shrimp Association was really influential at the time of the spill because of how many shrimpers were put out of work. Clint – using what power he had as their president – started lobbying local officials and BP. 

Clint Guidry: 

I lobbied and I – kind of makes me feel guilty for what I did – but I managed to get 'em all jobs and they started the Vessels of Opportunity. 

At first the Vessels of Opportunity program seemed like a win. But Clint grew increasingly concerned because he said the fishermen were working the frontlines of the disaster without the protective gear that he thought they needed. 

And the reason Clint thought they needed it was because he used to work as a superintendent at an oil refinery… and he knew how toxic the chemicals contained in crude oil are… 

Clint Guidry: 

Benzene at five parts per million, which is not a lot, that's not gonna burn your eyes. If it gets any more concentrated than that, it will, it will burn your eyes and choke you. 

In a refinery, at just five parts per million, you wear a respirator. Because Clint was hearing cleanup workers say their eyes were burning and they couldn't breathe, he estimated that the VOO workers were being exposed to 50 parts per million, at which point they should have been given positive pressure masks – they have motorized filters that clean the air. 

Clint Guidry:
And it really shook me up, you know? It was just, it just amazed me that they would go to such lengths not to protect people, you know.

Clint felt somewhat responsible for the situation the fishermen were in because he helped get them the jobs. So he met with the Coast Guard, the EPA, and other agencies, and raised hell about the lack of worker safety. And that's when the medevac incident occurred. 

Clint Guidry: 

They were all exposed to enough chemicals that they all wound up in the hospital. They couldn't breathe. Coughing, runny eyes, you know, just, I seen it in a refinery like that already.

Clint says he spoke with doctors at West Jefferson Hospital, and they thought the workers had chemical exposure. But as we know, BP and Coast Guard officials pointed to heat exhaustion, food poisoning, chemical sensitivity. 

Clint believes that cleanup workers were sprayed directly with Corexit by the airplanes, or that they were exposed to Corexit in the atmosphere.

He says that when he would show up at these small coastal towns to talk to fishermen that he could smell the Corexit in the air, and the residue would get all over his car and other surfaces. 

Clint Guidry:

The paint and the windshield would have this coating. 

Clint continued advocating for the fishermen, but he felt like they didn’t always want his help. He went to a meeting to talk to government officials about the importance of worker safety…  and to Clint's frustration, the fishermen that attended the meeting stayed quiet.

Clint Guidry: 

After the meeting, I walked out and I said, “I’ll tell you what. Y'all kept y'all mouth shut.” 'Cause none of 'em said a word. I said, “Y'all kept y'all mouth shut.” I said, “Y'all just gave them the right to kill all of y'all.”

One of the fishermen responded to Clint…

Clint Guidry: 

And he said, “We don't care if they kill us, so long as they keep the checks coming.” And I said, “Well, thank you very much.” [laughs] And that was the end of my experience trying to help 'em out. 'Cause they didn't care. They wanted the money. And I just had enough of it when I, at that point, I said, “Well, I'm, I'm going, I'm going over here. Try to get some money for the people who, uh, who care, who care about living.” [laughs] 

When Betsy asked Clint for more information about the medevaced workers, he shared a new detail about where one of them was working.

Clint Guidry:
He was in an area where there was a lot of oil, a lot of fresh oil. And one time, they had him working within six or seven miles from the rig. All that oil was coming up in the area where they were at and it was fresh out, fresh outta the ground.

Clint said this medevaced worker was assigned to ground zero – on the water, right above the leaking wellhead.

Betsy asked Clint for the name of this worker, and she got it. John Wunstell. Clint actually tried calling John for Betsy, but it just went to voicemail. And Clint wouldn't give out his phone number. 

And eventually, Clint got tired of reminiscing about the BP oil spill. 

Clint Guidry: 

It, it, it was, it was a, it was an experience I don't wanna relive, you know. I did it once in my life. That's enough. Don't wanna go back. [laughs]

Betsy Shepherd: 

Well, I think on that note, it's a wrap? 

Clint Guidry: 

A wrap.

So, without being able to reach John Wunstell – Betsy tried door knocking again.

[Knock, knock, knock]

And this time, one of the workers answered.

[Door opens]

Betsy Shepherd: 

Hello! 

Doug Blanchard: 

Hello there. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Are you Douglas Blanchard? 

Doug Blanchard: 

Yes, ma'am. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

My name is Betsy Shepherd. I'm a reporter. I'm doing a story on the BP oil spill, and I'm checking in with people to, you know, see how they've bounced back.

Doug Blanchard: 

Yeah [unclear] –

Betsy Shepherd: 

How you doing?

Doug Blanchard: 

I'm doing all right. Dizzy, dizzy, dizzy, dizzy. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Oh, you’re still – really? Still? 13 years later?

Doug Blanchard: 

The last few days is the worst it's been in a while.

Betsy Shepherd: 

Are you serious? 

Doug Blanchard: 

Yep.

Betsy Shepherd:

And do you think it's from working the cleanup? 

Doug Blanchard: 

I don't know. They say no. But you know, before I went into the cleanup, before I went into the oil spill, I just got all my blood tested and blood work and all that. No high cholesterol, no high blood pressure. And we was in all the disbursement. I got sent to the hospital with high blood pressure and all that.

Betsy Shepherd: 

May I come in and talk to you? 

Doug Blanchard: 

Yes ma'am. Come on in. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Okay. Let me, let me just grab my stuff. I'll be right back. 

Doug Blanchard: 

Alright. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Thanks for being so welcoming. 

Doug Blanchard:

Yeah…(fade out)

Doug Blanchard was almost one of the people we were searching for – he fell badly ill on May 26th, 2010. But he wasn't personally medevaced.

He says he was on a task force that consisted of his boat – Big Tattoo – and 20 or so other boats. And they would go out spotting oil off the coast of Louisiana for weeks at a time, without returning to shore. They slept out on the water.

He says on May 26th, he and the others started feeling ill. They were dizzy, had vision problems. He says it eventually got so bad they had to call for help. And one of his crew members was transported to a nearby hospital.

But Doug didn't want to abandon his boat. He insisted on driving back to shore. 

Doug Blanchard: 

So we all got to the dock, they might’ve had five or six ambulances and a bunch of medics taking everybody's blood pressure and all, and when it came to me, I had high blood pressure.

He initially refused to go to the hospital, and he had a back-and-forth with the medic who was treating him.

Doug Blanchard: 

You know, I didn't want to jump in no ambulance, so, so I asked him, “What would you do?” He said, “Bro, if you was my daddy and I was your son,” he said, “I would tell you to get the hell out of here and never come back.” That's all he told me. So I think he was honest. 

Doug relented and went to the hospital. And here is where his story gets strange. When Doug arrived, he wasn't taken inside the hospital. He says he was taken to a decontamination chamber outside, and stripped of all his clothes. 

Doug Blanchard: 

And they had a big tent set up with a bunch of compartments. Might have had six compartments in the thing. We had to take all our clothes off outside the hospital, take all our clothes off, go in this little compartment. They had one in a hazmat suit that would spray the whole spot [unclear] from the top.

He says people in hazmat suits came up to him. 

Doug Blanchard: 

You go in the next compartment, the guy would spray soap on you. You go in the next compartment, they give you a brush, you know them big handle brushes? You had to scrub yourself. Go in the next compartment, they would rinse you off again. You go in the next compartment, they give you a towel, they dry you off. Outside with a towel naked, sittin’ down over there.

Doug was confused – if he hadn't been exposed to some kind of dangerous chemical, why did he need to be decontaminated? He was also confused because he says the clothes they stripped him of were confiscated.

Doug Blanchard:

Our shoes, our clothes. Nothing we had on. We didn't get nothing back.

Betsy Shepherd: 

Did they tell you why they were confiscating your clothes and shoes? 

Doug Blanchard: 

I don't know why they didn't give us our clothes back. They ended up paying us some money, giving us some money for our clothes and shoes. 

After about a week, Doug decided to go back to work…

Doug Blanchard: 

I went back on the boat. I should have just stayed home. But when you're making money, it’s uh, you making money while you gotta, while the sun shines.

It’s a decision that Doug now regrets.

Today, he has chronic neurological and breathing problems. But despite this, Doug does consider himself lucky. Because another worker he knew died young – at the age of 56 – in 2020. 

Doug Blanchard: 

He got sick while he was doing BP. He was passing blood. I told him, “Man, you better go to the doctor. This mean you get outta here and go to the doctor.” But when you're making two, $3,000 a day, it is kinda hard to pass up for a poor shrimperman. You know? And it just kept on and kept on and got worse. And, uh, I went to see him right before he died. It wasn't too good. Everything was coming out the bottom of him. His whole inside was eatin’ up. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

That was one of the guys that um, was sent to the hospital with you?

Doug Blanchard: 

No, he was, uh, he didn’t go to the hospital. He was, uh, his favorite words were, “suck it up.” And he sucked it up.

[Brief pause to let last line sink in]

Doug also considers himself lucky in comparison to another worker he knows who was medevaced in May 2010.

His cousin, who he calls Weenie.

Betsy asked for Weenie’s real name – and it's John Wunstell, the same man that Clint Guidry tried to put Betsy in touch with. John Wunstell was the man we were looking for.

Doug said John Wunstell now suffers severe health problems, and he's become a very private person. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

You think he would talk to me?

Doug Blanchard: 

He might. Tell him Le Brasseur sent you. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Brasseur? 

Doug Blanchard: 

There’s a word in French, it’s “the stirrer.” 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Okay. 

Doug Blanchard: 

When you stirrin’ a pot, it’s brasser. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Brasser.

Doug Blanchard: 

But he calls me the shit stirrer [starts laughing], so I’ll stir [laughs/coughs]...

Betsy Shepherd: 

Okay. Say it one more time so I get it right.

Doug Blanchard: 

The brasseur.

So Betsy drove a couple miles up the bayou. She found a house next to a boat named “Ramie’s Wish.” 

[Knock, knock, knock]

John Wunstell's daughter, the titular Ramie, answered the door. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Hi. Is Weenie here? 

Ramie Wunstell: 

Huh? 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Is Weenie here? 

Ramie Wunstell: 

No. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

He’s not. 

Ramie Wunstell: 

No.

Betsy Shepherd:

Okay. Um, my name is Betsy Shepherd, and I'm a journalist doing a story about coastal Louisiana and recovery since the BP oil spill. 

Ramie Wunstell:

Okay. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

And, um, I was visiting with Douglas Blanchard, aka Le Brasseur. 

Ramie Wunstell: 

Yeah. 

Betsy Shepherd: 

And he [both laugh] – 

Ramie Wunstell: 

I guess he recommended my dad. [laughs] 

Betsy Shepherd: 

Yes, he did. He did. 

Ramie Wunstell: 

Yeah. [crosstalk] Right now, um, they not home. Well I could give you…watch, hold on, let me call my mom…[door creaks]

Betsy Shepherd: 

Okay, um, they’re out of town…? (fade under)

Ramie said she would give Betsy's contact information to John Wunstell, her dad, and if he wanted to tell his story – he’d reach out.

So, all Betsy and I could do was wait.

[Music rises: thoughtful; dreamy]

In the time we were waiting, I thought a lot about the phrase "suck it up." It's a sentiment I grew up with. My father would espouse the merits of sucking it up.  

[Music shifts]

Weeks passed before we heard from John Wunstell. When we got word, it wasn't from John himself; instead, we got a call from his lawyer.

The lawyer said that John was still in litigation against BP – 13 years later – over what happened to him. He said that John is currently fighting against post-traumatic stress. He's not doing well. He warned that an interview would be very stressful and emotionally taxing for his client.

But despite that, John had decided that he was finally ready to share his story with the public. He would discuss his work at ground zero, what happened the day he was medevaced, what's happened since, and why he's chosen to remain silent for 13 years.

He agreed to be interviewed. 

On the next episode of Ripple, John Wunstell.  

[Credits]